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Roundtable
The British economy: a crisis of 
Anglo-liberal capitalism?
Colin Hay’s book, The Failure of Anglo-Liberal Capitalism (2013), offers a powerful 
account of the origins and implications of Britain’s current economic malaise. Hay 
argues that the roots of the recent economic crisis lie in Britain’s complicity in the rise 
of an unstable Anglo-American model of capitalism that sustained consumption and 
economic growth via the acquisition of private debt. Critical of British governments of 
all parties, Hay outlines a new economic agenda for a more sustainable and inclusive 
model of growth. Renewal gathers here four refl ections on the book, and a response 
from Colin Hay.
The right central premise
Nicola Smith, Head of the Economic and Social Affairs Department of the TUC
The starting premise of Colin Hay’s analysis is that the roots of the fi nancial crisis can 
be found in the years preceding the crash. This is a presumption that few in the current 
government would disagree with, although their assessment would likely be different to 
Hay’s. While the Coalition narrative presents our current fi scal challenges as a conse-
quence of years of irresponsible public sector over-expenditure, Hay’s assessment is 
that without signifi cant change in the composition of UK growth we face on-going future 
economic risks. 
There is much to agree with in this headline analysis, and while my own assessment 
contains shades of difference to Hay’s, his central premise that the crisis revealed the 
need for signifi cant change in the UK economy is surely the right one. 
A crisis of credit?
In brief, the starting point of Hay’s argument is that those countries where consumption 
relied to the greatest extent upon rising household debt were fi rst affected by the crisis, 
which, given the global nature of both fi nancial markets and trade, then went on to 
impact on other nations. 
In part, this analysis is accurate. As credit markets froze and recession began, 
consumers with high debt obligations reigned in their spending or found they could no 
longer access the loans that were funding their purchases. On-going uncertainty meant 
others reduced their inclination to borrow. 
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But Hay’s position is arguably also partial in so far as it places insuffi cient focus on 
the extent to which high levels of private debt were indicative of out of control fi nancial 
sectors, and on the relationship between the size and nature of nations’ fi nancial 
services industries and the consequent impacts of the crisis on their economies. In the 
UK, for example, banks’ balance sheets tripled in size over the fi ve years from 2002. 
Capital buffers were low, and new funds tended to be short-term in nature rather than 
new deposits. The assets of RBS were worth (on paper) 150 per cent of UK GDP 
(Economist, 2013). The high leverage, short-term funding and limited regulation that 
characterised the sector (all of which had acted to support the consumer borrowing 
boom) meant that the fi nancial crisis hit the UK hard. 
The impacts of the crisis were also perhaps wider ranging than Hay’s analysis 
acknowledges. As banks’ balance sheets disintegrated, both consumer and business 
lending were squeezed (and with the latter having shown barely no recovery since 2008 
this sharp fall in business fi nance is still having a signifi cant impact on the UK’s 
economic prospects). Investment, consumption and confi dence plummeted and as 
trade was so far from able to make up the gap (even before the rest of the world had 
entered recession) the downturn took hold. 
Hay is right to draw attention to the UK’s dependence on consumer debt, but a 
broader approach to analysing the causes of the crash, and its multiple and on-going 
impacts, would strengthen his analysis. 
On-going risks
But Hay is undoubtedly right that high private debt remains a substantial downside risk 
for the UK economy. The latest Bank of England fi nancial stability report (2012) suggests 
that 40 per cent of the UK’s outstanding mortgages are now interest only (a proportion 
that rises to 50 per cent in some regions) and that around three quarters of interest only 
mortgage holders are reliant upon the sale of the home as their repayment plan. While 
household debt ratios have fallen in the UK since the fi nancial crisis, rates remain signifi -
cantly higher than a decade ago, and well above 150 per cent of income. The Bank 
concludes that ‘an unexpected rise in interest rates would increase debt-servicing 
burdens and might induce a fall in property prices’, which underlines the fragility of our 
recovery. 
Hay is also right to point out that the UK’s over infl ated housing market remains an 
on-going challenge. In the years running up to 2008 the rate of house price growth in 
the UK outpaced many other developed economies, and undersupply seems to have 
been the most signifi cant factor in preventing a crash of the sort that the US market has 
suffered. With prices still so far removed from incomes, the potential for further price 
falls (at least outside of London) remains real, with clear potential implications for house-
hold fi nancial health. 
However, Hay’s assessment neglects to mention a key part of the puzzle – the 
extent to which rising reliance on debt fi nanced expenditure has been a consequence 
not only of a house price boom, and unrestricted access to credit, but also of stagnating 
household incomes driven primarily by declining real wages and now considered by the 
ONS to be a key factor contributing to current slow growth in household spending. 
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In recent research from the IMF research department Michael Kumhof and 
Romain Ranciere (2010) found that fi nancial liberalisation helps workers smooth 
consumption, but at the cost of higher household debt and larger current account 
defi cits (as savings ratios are low). But crucially, when looking across different coun-
tries, they also identify rising income inequality as a key driver of these trends, and 
point to the need to distribute the rewards of growth more fairly as a prerequisite for 
stronger future outcomes. Stronger and fairer wage growth is central to their 
suggested solutions. 
The UK is a perfect case study for this analysis. The wages of middle income 
Britain grew by an average of just 56 per cent between 1978 and 2008, despite GDP 
increasing by 108 per cent over the same period, and for some workers real income 
growth was far less (Lansley, 2011). The reasons behind this concerning trend are 
complex, refl ecting both growing pay inequalities and slowing rates of real pay 
increases for workers on lower and middle incomes, along with occupational change 
across the UK jobs market (put simply, a rise in lower paid jobs in parts of the service 
sector accompanied by a fall in better paid middle income jobs in areas including 
manufacturing and administration). But its impacts are clear: stagnant living standards 
where spending is more likely to be supported by lending and equity release rather 
than rising real incomes. 
Hay could therefore strengthen his critique of the sustainability of UK consumption 
if he focused as much on the poor state of real pay growth as on the extent to which 
spending has been supported by rising house prices and wider borrowing.
A fair assessment of Labour’s performance
While Hay is right that it may well have been economically convenient for all govern-
ments to hope the bust was never going to come, he is perhaps too harsh when he 
claims that the previous administration actively pursued a strategy of asking house 
prices to fi ll the gap left by a residualised welfare state. While single unemployed people 
certainly saw little improvement in their real incomes (as Hay’s analysis of benefi t 
replacement ratios shows), some groups (most signifi cantly families with children) saw 
real benefi ts from the introduction of tax credits, and the Pensions Commission’s 
recommendations paved the way for some strengthening of provision in retirement. A 
fairer critique would be that the policy community experienced a collective failure to see 
the risks inherent in the bubble (and in the UK’s growing wealth and income disparities), 
rather than presenting the government as having overseen an explicit strategy to replace 
social security with property equity.
On the other hand, Hay is perhaps too optimistic in saying that Labour have 
‘avoided the blame’ for the crash. The challenge of presenting the electorate with a 
compelling vision of a new economy which both meets public concerns and can be 
delivered in straightened fi nancial times is signifi cant, and public trust that any political 
party can deliver substantial economic change, while also getting the public fi nances 
back on track, is low. While things could undoubtedly be worse for progressives, there 
is little room for complacency about public opinion.
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Where next for the UK economy?
Hay concludes that we face a number of signifi cant medium-term risks, and that moves 
towards a new economy will be diffi cult. He’s right, particularly given the current govern-
ment’s aspirations to secure increased private saving and to improve Britain’s trade and 
investment performance appear to have been abandoned. Instead, while real household 
incomes continue to plummet, austerity Britain is pinning its growth expectations on 
another house price boom. 
But again perhaps the focus of Hay’s conclusions is too narrow. He is right that 
we need to recognise that growth is the best way to get the defi cit down and that we 
need an internationally co-ordinated stimulus. And he’s also correct that banks need 
to lend more (the lack of net lending targets was a signifi cant government mistake) 
and that there’s a case for both greater public investment and national and regional 
banking structures to more effectively channel private investment into the real 
economy. 
But, as he acknowledges, these changes are far from suffi cient. The substantial 
shifts that we need to see in the overall investment share of the economy will need 
banking, corporate governance, and public sector reform working in combination. 
Raising living standards will need policies that deliver both faster rates of real pay 
growth along with the creation of more jobs in higher value sectors and the closure of 
the employment rate gaps that characterised the last decade. If we want less income 
inequality, redistribution will need to continue to play a vital role, which means we may 
need to think again about tax. 
And there are also areas where Hay’s conclusions do seem to risk leading us in the 
wrong direction. His assumption that fi nancial sector regulation may serve to reduce our 
potential capacity and limit short-term growth does seem to risk undermining much of 
the rest of his critique. While he is right that bank lending to business needs to rise if 
investment is to grow I do not believe that this objective confl icts with the aim of 
securing a safer and more responsible fi nancial services sector. The UK will always need 
a strong fi nancial services sector but if progressives are serious about a new economy 
then it also needs to be very different from what has come before, both because of the 
economic catastrophe which could ensue if we don’t better manage risk and because 
ballooning markets in property and fi nancial products risk squeezing out the productive 
investment, export and wage growth that we need if there’s to be any hope of building a 
fairer and stronger economy in the medium-term. 
Similarly, Hay’s conclusion that there has been too much focus on high pay seems 
counter-intuitive. Excessive executive bonuses and the growing income inequality they 
represent were a key cause of the crisis, and if we don’t address them (through both 
taxation and sectoral rebalancing as well as regulation), and achieve a fairer income 
distribution over the medium-term, we’re unlikely to be much closer to a better 
economic model for the future. 
But overall Hay’s broad assumptions are right – in key areas our pre-crisis economy 
was failing to deliver, and our future economic health depends on making sure we don’t 
repeat the same mistakes again. 
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We need a new variety of British capitalism
Tony Dolphin, Senior Economist and Associate Director for Economic Policy at the IPPR
It is more than fi ve years since the UK economy went into recession as a result of the 
fi nancial crisis, yet real GDP is still over two per cent below its peak level before the 
recession and unemployment is one million higher than it was at the beginning of 2008. 
Despite this appalling record, there is little evidence that Britain’s economic model – 
Anglo-liberalism as Colin Hay calls it – is about to be thrown out and replaced by a new 
variety of capitalism. This will seem odd to many, but it is understandable for a number 
of reasons.
First, economic paradigm shifts are extremely rare. There have only been two in 
Britain in the last century: the ‘Keynesian revolution’ in the 1940s and its replacement by 
‘Anglo-liberalism’ in the 1970s/80s. Second, when shifts do occur, they do not come 
immediately after the crisis that triggers them: Keynesianism was a response to the 
Great Depression of the 1930s; Anglo-liberalism a response to the stagfl ation of the 
early 1970s. And third, neither the Coalition nor the Labour Party has yet articulated a 
coherent alternative to Anglo-liberalism.
As Colin Hay also points out, the Coalition has in effect defended Anglo-liberalism 
by framing Britain’s economic problem as a debt crisis rather than a growth crisis. This 
has enabled it to fi ght the debate about policy in the short-term on the ground of its 
choosing. Platitudes such as ‘you cannot borrow your way out of a debt crisis’ may be 
bad economics, but they strike such a chord with the public that the Labour leadership 
is reluctant to whole-heartedly adopt the more sensible alternative, as espoused by Paul 
Krugman and others, of using fi scal policy to support the economy while private 
demand is weak and monetary policy ineffectual. As a result, they give the impression of 
not having a coherent policy for the economy. How different it would be if Labour was 
willing to argue unreservedly that the UK’s problem was not an excess of public debt 
but a defi ciency of growth and that ‘you cannot cut your way out of a growth crisis’.
However, this growth crisis has not just emerged in the last few years; it was there 
well before the recession began, hidden by an unsustainable build-up in household and 
fi nancial sector debt. Regrettably, although Labour accepts growth was over-reliant on 
fi nancial services, it is reluctant to acknowledge fully the role of debt in supporting 
growth during this period because to do so would undermine its ability to take credit for 
the seemingly good performance of the economy during its fi rst two and a half terms in 
offi ce. Until it does so, however, it cannot begin to develop a serious alternative to 
Anglo-liberalism.
The starting point for a new variety of British capitalism has to be a sustained attack 
on the defi ciencies of the Anglo-liberal model, combined with a realistic assessment of 
the structural pressures likely to be placed on the economy in coming years. It needs, 
therefore, to show how the fi nancialisation of the British economy, and the strong pound 
that accompanied it, crowded out investment and growth in the rest of the economy 
and accelerated the decline in manufacturing; it needs to argue that an economy which 
has recorded current account defi cits in every one of the last thirty years is not a 
successful one; it needs to make the case that Britain will never be a strong economy 
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while inequalities between its regions continue to increase; it needs to attack the 
growing inequalities in income and wealth that built up over the last 30 years and it 
needs to understand why over four million people were still claiming out-of-work 
benefi ts in 2007 after fi fteen years of uninterrupted economic growth. It should also 
re-examine the role of the infl ation target, given the absence of any trade-off between 
unemployment and infl ation over the last two decades. And it needs to understand how 
technological change and globalisation are reshaping the British economy and why 
private sector fi rms are unable to adjust rapidly enough to maintain output growth close 
to its historical trend rate.
If anything sums up the need for an alternative to Anglo-liberalism, it is the failure of 
the Coalition to deliver on its promise to rebalance the economy. A 25 per cent devalua-
tion of sterling was supposed to deliver growth led by exports, which would in turn lead 
to stronger investment spending and so reduce the need for growth to rely on debt and 
consumer spending. However, exports have not grown more strongly over the last few 
years. This has been blamed on the crisis in the eurozone, but that is only part of the 
problem. Despite the devaluation and big increases in exports to countries like China, 
Britain is not winning market share in emerging economies and British fi rms are not 
taking an increased share of their domestic market at the expense of importers. Under 
Anglo-liberalism, Britain’s industrial base was allowed to shrink to the point that it no 
longer has the capacity to compete effectively, even when given a big boost to its 
competitiveness. And the Coalition is so devoid of ideas to rectify the situation that it is 
now prepared fall back on mortgage debt as a source of growth: risking a repeat of the 
worst mistakes of the Labour years with its Help to Buy scheme.
Some of the elements of a new variety of British capitalism should, therefore, be 
clear. Unemployment should be given an equal weight with infl ation in the determination 
of monetary policy, not just for the next year or two, but on a permanent basis. Rather 
than pump-priming the mortgage market and encouraging another increase in house-
hold debt, more houses should built. Financial markets should be more heavily 
regulated, in particular to introduce more competition into banking and to stop the 
extraction of rents from the rest of the economy. Labour market policies should be 
designed to increase signifi cantly the employment rates of those who have traditionally 
been disadvantaged in the labour market: the young and the old, the disabled, certain 
ethnic groups, and those with no or only low level qualifi cations. Industrial policies 
should be unashamedly focused on supporting exporters and potential exporters and on 
helping the private sector to respond to the effects of globalisation and technological 
change, in particular in the regions. And there should be a greater role for alternatives to 
shareholder capitalism, in the form of mutuals and cooperatives, so that employees 
have a greater say in the running of companies.
The Keynesian revolution heralded a different way of conducting fi scal policy in 
order to maintain low unemployment. It was also associated with nationalisation and a 
corporatist approach to the economy. The Anglo-liberal revolution involved a shift to 
using monetary policy to control infl ation. It then introduced privatisation, liberalisation, 
deregulation and heavy reliance on the fi nancial sector for growth, and under Labour 
governments combined these with tax and spend policies to redistribute the proceeds 
of growth. A third revolution, to replace Anglo-liberalism, is now needed and may 
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emerge over the next decade. It should involve another shift in the focus of macroeco-
nomic policy, giving less weight to infl ation and more to unemployment. There should 
also be a more active role for government in the economy. Rather than standing to one 
side and leaving the private sector to cope with deindustrialisation, Britain needs the 
government to work in collaboration with industry to produce more sustainable growth 
and a more equal sharing of increased prosperity.
Mobilising politically against Anglo-liberalism
Peter Taylor-Gooby, Professor of Social Policy at the University of Kent
Colin Hay’s essay sets out a clear account of the economic crisis as a crisis of priva-
tised Keynesianism, set in the context of the inherent instability of the Anglo-liberal 
‘privatised Keynesian’ growth model, and triggered by the failure of the fi nancial system 
to sustain the required level of borrowing. The cure is not resuscitation of this system, 
as the policies promoted by the Coalition and by the European Central Bank, IMF and 
the OECD imply, but its replacement with a growth model that rests on real production. 
This involves recognising that the crisis is not at root a crisis of debt, which needs to be 
squeezed out of the system by cutting spending and clearing space for a private sector 
led recovery, but a crisis inherent in a growth-model that depended to a considerable 
extent on consumption fuelled by debt. This leads to an alternative analysis that 
suggests a growth model in which the state leads investment in productive enterprises 
and in which defi cit reduction plays a secondary role, to be achieved in line with real 
growth in the productive economy.
It is one thing to develop a better analysis of the crisis and its solution and another 
to generate a feasible strategy for securing electoral support so that the new policies 
can be implemented. The Coalition’s approach is two-pronged: cuts to reduce the 
defi cit, and a wholesale restructuring of virtually every aspect of the public sector. The 
restructuring is presented in terms of promoting competitiveness and cost-effi ciencies 
and allowing a wider range of providers to contribute. The Open Public Services White 
Paper says: ‘wherever possible, public services should be open to a range of providers’ 
(Cabinet Offi ce, 2011, 9). One effect of the reforms, intended or not, may be to create 
circumstances in which the cuts can be permanently embedded and in which the polit-
ical climate of the UK can be shifted permanently in a neo-liberal direction (see 
Taylor-Gooby, 2013, for more detailed discussion of the evidence).
The restructuring programme is large. It includes competitive tendering with compe-
tition effectively on price across much of public services: the commissioning budget that 
makes up some two-thirds of NHS spending; most of social care services; large areas 
of local government provision, almost all the employment service; the prison service and 
in other areas. These reforms have the effect of undermining the social institutions 
which represented successful collectivism, notably the NHS and to some extent care 
services. The privatisations typically achieve savings by using non-unionised staff. The 
capacity of professionals to organise on their own behalf or on behalf of service users is 
weakened. Accountability for local services through local government is also damaged. 
Combined with this are major reforms to benefi ts which will have the effect of cutting 
Renewal 21.2-3.indd   71 28/08/2013   16:01:29
RENEWAL Vol 21 No. 2/3
72
rates for those on low wages or in poor housing, and linking entitlement to job-seeking 
behaviour for the unemployed and many sick and disabled people.
These changes reinforce general tendencies towards a more liberal political climate 
in which it is the individual’s own responsibility to seize such opportunities as are avail-
able and in which outcomes are seen more as a matter of individual blame or praise. 
They go hand in hand with acceptance of the rapid growth of inequality during the last 
three decades, in which the UK has moved from a European to a US pattern of income 
distribution. They follow the stigmatisation of the poor as work-shy, responsible for their 
own circumstances.
In this context liberal market solutions occupy the lead position as the natural 
framework within which most people think about public policy and citizenship and which 
sets parameters for political debate. New policy directions must defeat the neo-liberal 
account at an analytic level. They must also help build the institutions which will direct 
people’s understanding of their social lives and interests towards collective solutions.
Current proposals developed on the left include:
•  Greater transparency, so that the fact that 59 per cent of those in poverty live 
in working households and only one in eight of them are unemployed, replace 
the assumptions of welfare scrounging prevalent in the media and in political 
rhetoric; similarly the reality of inequality, the speed with which it has grown, 
and the low taxes and limited social contribution of many of the wealthy can be 
pressed home;
•  Citizenship welfare, restructured to stress the contribution that individuals make 
as former or potential workers, as carers and as voluntary workers (Horton and 
Gregory, 2009);
•  The importance of investment not only through the kind of public investment into 
productive industry that is stressed by the critique of the Anglo-liberal model, but 
in social investment which would put resources into such areas as childcare that 
releases mothers for paid work, training to enhance productivity, and care for 
older people, where there is evidence that properly designed programmes can 
generate a real return to society in growth and to the Treasury in taxation and 
benefi ts saved (Ben-Galim, 2011; Pickard, 2012);
•  Recognition of the importance of adequate wages, through the Living Wage 
programme and making the case for ‘predistribution’ (Pennycook, 2012).
Putting new ideas into practice requires the identifi cation of a social force that will push 
through the necessary changes. One possibility in the struggle against Anglo-liberalism 
is the emerging politics of New Social Risks. The institutions of traditional social democ-
racy were shaped by the class struggles of post-war industrialism and included state 
intervention to meet the needs that male workers could not address through trade union 
politics, their own market incomes, and the dependent unwaged labour of women in 
families as wives and mothers – health care, pensions and education. These remain the 
core services of modern welfare states and are highly popular.
 The transition to post-industrialism and the decline of the family-wage manufac-
turing sector, the greater instability of working lives, the normalisation of paid work for 
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women, and the further pressures of globalisation lead to the emergence of New Social 
Risks. These concern access to adequate care services (child and elder care) to substi-
tute for informal labour; training and retraining that will help people get into the labour 
market and maintain a position; and decent wages and conditions of work in the face of 
global competition. New Social Risks impact on people’s lives across a range of social 
classes and across gender, ethnic, and regional divides. The new insecurities and the 
capacity of the state as the only agency capable of addressing them may form the basis 
for a new post-industrial collectivism. It is only by reforms that build such collectivism 
that the political support necessarily for a decisive break with the Anglo-liberal tradition 
can be developed. This requires determination and political leadership.
There is no silver bullet
Hopi Sen, writer and blogger at www.hopisen.com
First questions
Colin Hay poses a provocative series of questions. To what extent is there a ‘decidedly 
and distinctive Anglo-Liberal’ conception of capitalism, and if there is, is this model 
‘complicit and culpable’ in our recent economic travails? If the answer to these ques-
tions is yes, then what can be done about it? Hay argues that only by recognising the 
extent of the systemic fl aws in the ‘Anglo-Liberal’ growth model can we come to terms 
with the full extent of what is broken and understand what can be fi xed.
Oddly, I dissent entirely from the diagnosis, which seems to seek to fi t the facts 
rather uncomfortably and unconvincingly to the theory, but largely agree with the 
proposed cures, which represent a theoretical coming to terms with the practical limita-
tions faced by governments in the face of larger tides than mere ideological will, and 
displays a sympathy for the diffi cult future which is rather absent from his analysis of the 
easy past.
Naming of parts
What exactly is the ‘excessively liberalised Anglo-American form of capitalism’? Hay 
sets out a nine-fold defi nition: assertive neo-liberalism; an elite policy community; dereg-
ulation and privatisation; dependence on cheap fuel; debt; risk; the absence of ‘a 
coherent theory of society’ (incoherent theories of society presumably being plentiful); 
the embedding of inequalities; and a limited view of global governance. He then argues 
that these characteristics were pursued in their purest form in the USA and UK. 
My fi rst objection is to the absence of other anglophone countries from the ‘Anglo-
liberal’ model. What do Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have to do to get our 
attention? If any country embraced ‘Anglo-liberalism’ with true passion, it was New 
Zealand, while the Canadian and Australian governments broadly pursued the same 
agenda as their British and American colleagues, but with subtle and important differ-
ences. That none of these culturally ‘anglo’ and economically ‘liberal’ economies are 
stranded in the growthless ‘recovery’ Britain and the eurozone are enduring might 
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suggest that an ‘Anglo-liberal model’ is neither as defi nitively broken nor as clearly 
defi ned as it fi rst seems.
If the proposed defi nition is not so much culturally ‘anglo’ and more ideologically 
‘liberal’, I confess I don’t fully understand from the nine points what uniquely sets the 
‘Anglo-liberal model’ apart from other global, and specifi cally European, economies. 
Was the price of oil more economically signifi cant to Ireland than Italy? Are the products 
of the French grandes écoles more or less elitist that those of Oxbridge? Did mortgage 
debt rise as a share of income faster in America than in Sweden? Is the theory of 
society less coherent in Australia than China?
Further, it’s not at all clear that the model of Anglo-liberal governments exporting 
their orthodoxy (or spreading the contagion) to European countries is the whole story. 
When it comes to fi nancial sector liberalisation, for example, Germany’s fi nancial sector 
was more liberal in the early seventies than that of either the US or Britain (see 
Williamson and Mahar, 1998). Who exactly was following who? More recently, If New 
Labour’s ‘orthodox neo-monetarist’ decision to hand operational independence to the 
Bank of England in 1997 was Anglo-liberal in character, what should we say about the 
Bundesbank, or the independence of the French central bank in 1994?
It’s not all about us
This may seem petty, but defi ning what precisely represents a ‘decided and distinctive’ 
Anglo-liberal model becomes important when deciding to what extent this model is 
broken. Perhaps one way to do this would be to develop a scoring system to identify 
Anglo-liberalism. We could begin by examining the methods of the most enthusiastic 
free market champions. Who do the neo-liberals themselves praise? Each year, 
America’s Heritage Foundation produces an ‘Index of Economic Freedom’. ‘Anglo-
liberal’ countries regularly come close to the top, including Australia, New Zealand, 
Ireland, Canada, the US and Great Britain. So perhaps there is an ‘Anglo-liberal’ model. 
However, the anglophone countries are usually rated below small open trading econo-
mies like Hong Kong, Singapore and Switzerland, and moreover are bunched closely 
with such welfare state economies as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland. 
A similar ranking is produced by the Fraser Institute. If Sweden is almost as neo-liberal 
as Hong Kong, then perhaps the defi nition needs more work!
These models have several fl aws, but even granting Hay’s theory of Anglo-American 
particularism, it’s not clear whether the Anglo-liberal economies were the most egregious 
offenders against sound policy in the boom years. As Hay notes, in the years to 2007, 
America’s ratio of residential mortgage debt to GDP increased by less than almost every 
other major economy, while Britain’s increase in outstanding household debt was on a 
par with the Netherlands and Finland, and our increase in house prices was similar to 
France. If the Anglo-liberal economies were culpable, then so was almost everyone else.
An alternative explanation might be that for the decade after the creation of the euro 
(and the end of the communist East), Europe saw a radical reduction in the cost of 
borrowing in the European periphery compared to the core, leading to a surge in debt 
and housing investment in countries as varied as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal. The extent to which private debt increased in these 
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countries was directly related to the increased ‘gain’ from falling interest rates and 
expectations for future growth (Higgins and Klitgaard, 2011).
Arguably, the exposure of the Baltic, central European and periphery nations to a 
seizing of fi nancial markets was less a result of Anglo-liberal contagion and more due to 
a European boom, which had precious little to do with Anglo-anything. If there was 
‘house price Keynesianism’, it was more a result of the euro than Anglo-liberalism. 
Alongside this, and at the same time, Western economies generally enjoyed a 
decade of low infl ation and low interest rates, driven by a combination of structural and 
supply-side reforms, manageable fuel costs, technological and productivity advances, 
and so on. This model explains the idea of the ‘NICE’ (non-infl ationary consistently 
expansionary) decade. 
Under this model, the obvious German exceptionalism becomes less an expression 
of Teutonic restraint versus Anglo-Saxon freedom and more a result of the interplay of 
complex economic factors. After all, if euro-integration meant lower interest rates for 
the periphery, it also meant a change in Germany’s economic relationship with the 
periphery.
How then to explain the eventual bust? I agree with Hay’s account of a combination 
of low interest rates for an extended period, leading to a boom in property hot-spots, 
the worst risks of which were disguised by the increasingly complex underpinnings of an 
emerging global fi nancial system. As Hay describes, when interest rate increases hit the 
US residential property market, the players in this market, who were found all around 
the West, found they didn’t know what cards they were holding, what they were worth, 
or who was going to get landed with the Queen of Spades.
The limits of politics
Whether Anglo-liberal or not, Hay suggests the fault lies not in the regulation and 
management of the system, but in the decisions by ‘Anglo-liberal’ empowered central 
bankers to hold interest rates low across the late nineties and noughties. If this is right, 
it becomes important to explain how a different, more political, system would have 
delivered a better outcome.
British history, at least, is not helpful here. Under both Barber and Lawson, interest 
rates were used to stoke a boom, which then had to have the brakes applied harshly 
when infl ationary pressures got out of hand. Even under the ‘Ken and Eddie’ show, the 
politician was consistently the voice for lower interest rates. Labour’s record was not 
much better, though Labour Chancellors tended to confront balance of payments and 
devaluation crises.
In Britain, the evidence is not that politicians would have pushed virtuously for 
increased interest rates. Instead, they may even have held them lower when politically 
convenient then pushed them up rapidly in response to the crisis, provoking the sort of 
tipping point ‘boom and bust’ crisis we’d seen so often before. 
But what if interest rates had been higher? Last year, in his, perhaps self-justifi ca-
tory, refl ection on the crisis, Mervyn King imagined what the British economy would 
have looked like if the Bank of England had increased interest rates during his tenure at 
the Bank, in an attempt to restrain asset price infl ation. He argued that the view of the 
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majority of the MPC was consistently that ‘higher interest rates would have moderated 
domestic credit growth and asset prices, but only at the expense of slower output 
growth, rising unemployment and a prolonged undershoot of the infl ation target’ (King, 
2012). King’s solution to this was increased leverage caps, macro-prudential regulation 
of the fi nance sector, and a greater willingness to undershoot infl ation targets and lower 
short run output growth in order to avoid asset bubbles.
Worthwhile Canadian initiative
At this point, my analysis and Hay’s, having diverged greatly, begin to converge once 
more. It’s all horrendously complex. There may or may not be a big Anglo-liberal bad 
infecting everyone else. If there is, extricating yourself from such is awkward. If there 
isn’t, one cannot simply resolve the problem by no longer being so foolishly anglo, or 
idiotically liberal. So where did we go wrong, and how can we put it right?
First, there is the question of how to deal with the possibility of asset price infl ation 
due to sustained low interest rates. If it is possible to fi nd a technical or regulatory 
solution to the very real issue of extended low interest rates leading to housing price 
bubbles in economies of all sorts, then perhaps it is here we should direct our attention. 
I confess I am left confused by Hay’s advice here. On the one hand, he seems to be 
arguing that the error of the past was overly liberal fi nancial services policies, which led 
to excessive willingness among banks to accept higher risk mortgage customers, turbo 
charging an unsustainable asset price boom whose continuing fragility remains a severe 
risk to the UK economy. 
On the other hand he identifi es ‘a step-level increase in the cost of borrowing in 
Britain that has too often gone unnoticed’, and seems to regard the high relative cost of 
mortgage borrowing while banks display (or are forced into displaying) risk aversion as a 
bad thing (Hay, 2013, 53). Yet on the same page, he argues that the Bank of England 
has overthrown its mandate by not increasing the base interest rates to squeeze infl a-
tion. As far as I can tell, the overall position seems to be that the Bank should increase 
base rates to squeeze out infl ation, while at the same time banks should reduce their 
spreads to encourage consumer and commercial demand. These proposals seem to act 
against each other.
This perhaps highlights Hay’s point that it is hard to fi nd a non-complex solution to 
our relationship with mortgages and housing. One option might be to examine the rather 
more successful Anglo-liberal economies. Canada combines a classically liberal 
economy with low interest rates with much tougher conditions for mortgage lending and 
a greater provision of housing for rent, both of which have the effect of reducing 
exposure to housing price infl ation in periods of extended low interest rates. The 
Canadian system regulates the loan to value level of a mortgage at 80 per cent, and 
expects that if a bank wishes to lend more than this level, it must seek insurance from 
the state or other private providers (Kiff, 2009).
This won’t solve our current problem, but might help prevent a similar reoccurrence 
in future. It is, however, a regulatory and technical solution to a specifi c problem, rather 
than an assault on either linguistic tendencies or an economic ideology. Canada, after 
all, is mostly anglo and mostly economically liberal.
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This isn’t to say introducing such a system to the UK in the 1980s or 1990s would 
have been politically possible. I fi nd it hard to picture a politician of any party deciding 
that it would be electorally useful or economically advisable to intervene in a growing 
economy in order to limit the availability of mortgages to working people on low to 
middle incomes. The Canadian system works, in part, because it is now organic, having 
been developed to meet housing needs after the Second World War. Grafting it onto 
another model may well be easier now, when there is limited mortgage availability 
anyway, than when it would have represented the state stepping in to crush people’s 
dreams of home-ownership.
Next, Hay suggests a gradual shift from private to public investment, or rather, an 
increase in public investment alongside and supporting an increase in private invest-
ment in targeted areas of commercial activity. Here I have great sympathy with his case. 
It is clear that current borrowing is cheap, and it would be relatively simple to fi nance 
extra infrastructure investment, especially if future income streams were identifi ed to 
support such activity, while measures like an industrial bank, loan insurance, support for 
innovation and R&D spending will all help encourage private investment. 
I also agree with Hay on the value of ‘a far more selective and strategic channeling 
of the supply of credit ... into new sources of growth (in manufacturing and services). 
That entails ... a focused assault on interest rate spreads in areas identifi ed as targets 
for investment in the new growth model’ (Hay, 2013, 60), though I see the most effective 
mechanism for this less as a political assault on lenders and more as the creation of an 
institutional framework of lenders, risk insurance, and innovation investment that will 
reduce the effective risk, cost and diffi culty for borrowers in key growth areas. (Think 
Sparkassen, the US SBIR, KfW reinsurance, and so on).
These measures, however, cost money, and while in the short-term they could be 
supported by borrowing, as growth returns the Keynesian counter-cyclicality that works 
for state expansion at the moment begins to call for steady defi cit reduction and 
eventual debt repayment. Hay’s call for conditional defi cit reduction is sensible and 
right, and follows the steps made by governments like Chile and Sweden in setting up 
robust fi scal institutions to police the sort of rule he discusses. However, this will mean 
signifi cant pain elsewhere, and the left will need to come to terms with this.
Further, while I agree with Hay that international co-ordination of defi cit strategy is 
vital (I’d add a revenue strategy too; the continuing failure to develop a common 
European corporation tax regime being one obvious example – see Lannoo, 2013 for the 
long and boring history of this effort), we should not be starry-eyed about what this 
would produce. As a nation on the edge of Europe, the obvious co-ordination would be 
with European policy, and I am unsure if this would be an improvement even on the 
current administration!
Eventually, though, growth will return at a non-negligible level. At that point a 
combination of the need for Keynesian counter-cyclical defi cit reduction and the long-
term fi scal pressures on the state mean it will be exceedingly diffi cult to provide extra 
industrial and investment incentives over a sustained period without a strategic with-
drawal by the state elsewhere or a substantial increase in taxation revenue, or both. 
(The OBR currently projects that if policy is unchanged, debt as a share of GDP will not 
fall below 60 per cent before rising again).
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In the short-term, creating the space to invest might involve front loading industrial 
or capital programmes from future tax increases for pensioners and savings on welfare, 
as the Social Market Foundation have proposed (Mulheirn, 2012). However, a short-term 
policy will not be enough. A long-term shift toward public and industrial investment 
might require a policy of limited pay and employment increases in the public sector, real 
terms reductions in services budgets, increased co-payment for services, welfare condi-
tionality and broad-based tax increases.
As you might guess, this is not an agenda politicians are likely to embrace with 
delight unless they feel there is either no alternative or a public willingness to take 
unpleasant medicine. On the left especially, such a programme would need to be clearly 
couched in terms of creating employment, raising skills and earning capacity, and lifting 
incomes for the many.
So what can we on the left do? For me, one useful step would be to abjure entirely the 
idea of a single, dramatic intervention. The economy is weak, our resources are limited, 
and the situation is fragile. To get to a better place requires a step by step, gradual reform 
of institutions, policies and regulations that will eventually take us to a better place, one 
that will, in many ways look a lot like Britain does now, just as Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand feel instinctively familiar, but will at the same time feel very different.
The other useful role we on the left can play is to re-accustom ourselves to the idea 
of shared sacrifi ce. The changes we need to make will not be easy, or straightforward. 
They will involve pain and dismay and the abandonment of treasured salients for a more 
defensible line from which to advance. This will be especially diffi cult for those of us 
who see the value in social spending, in the active state, and the fair distribution of 
reward.
However, the fi nal lesson of history is that if the left is unwilling to undertake painful 
but needed structural reform, the right will eventually do so in a far more harmful and 
divisive way. So the task falls to us, and it is vital we do not avoid it in favour of either 
hunting phantom villains or sketching idealised utopias that can never come to pass. It 
is in these last points, and on the value of wrestling with the world as it is, that Hay 
leaves us with the strongest of his insights.
Getting Anglo-liberal capitalism right… and putting its pathologies right
Colin Hay, Professor of Politics at the University of Sheffi eld and Sciences Po, Paris
I should start by thanking Ben Jackson and Renewal for fi rst proposing and then organ-
ising and hosting this debate on my little book, The Failure of Anglo-Liberal Capitalism. 
Whatever one thinks about the content and analysis I offer, the debate is a crucial one 
to have – and this is a vital time to be having it. That said, my interest in this debate is of 
course not simply that these issues and, more specifi cally, my ideas about the failure of 
Anglo-liberal capitalism, are discussed. So I am both relieved and delighted to fi nd so 
much common ground with such a distinguished and infl uential group of commentators. 
And that relief and delight is as much political as it is intellectual – for it is only if, as and 
when we can agree on what is broken that we can start to put it right. That, in the end, 
is what counts. 
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While there is much common ground between us, the four contributions are in fact 
very different in character from one another. Peter Taylor-Gooby builds from many of 
the same premises to extend the analysis I present in The Failure of Anglo-Liberal 
Capitalism to consider, quite rightly, how a wider political coalition might be built for 
the kind of alternative growth model I propose (and that we are both committed to). 
Tony Dolphin also extends the analysis of the book, examining in a little more detail the 
implications for the balance between infl ation and unemployment in monetary policy 
and how the long-term structural weakness of the manufacturing sector might be 
addressed in building a more sustainable and export-oriented growth model. Hopi Sen 
and Nicola Smith are ostensibly more critical. Though accepting the case for many of 
the substantive policy reforms I propose, the former takes issue with my attempt to 
characterise the contemporary British political and economic affl iction as a crisis of a 
specifi cally ‘Anglo-liberal’ growth model. The latter seeks to identify a number of issues 
which she sees as slipping too easily through the net of my analysis, suggesting how 
each might give a subtly different infl ection to the general case for reform that I 
present. In what follows I seek to respond briefl y to each in turn, perhaps inevitably 
concentrating a little more on the more critical engagements of Sen and Smith in the 
hope of clarifying some ambiguities, resolving some misinterpretations, and estab-
lishing what, if anything, still divides us. 
Peter Taylor-Gooby: combining a new growth model with a new social model
Peter Taylor-Gooby is (characteristically) generous in accepting: (i) my characterisation 
of the crisis as one of a ‘privatised Keynesian’ or ‘Anglo-liberal’ growth model based on 
consumption fuelled by credit; (ii) the need for a new alternative growth model that can 
deliver a steady and stable supply of credit to growth- and job-creating sectors; and (iii) 
the need to relegate defi cit reduction to a secondary role – something to be achieved 
with (a portion of) the proceeds of growth, not itself a condition of economic good 
health or growth (and certainly not a priority trumping growth). 
His concern, quite appropriately, is with the building of popular support for such a 
new growth model and his anxiety is that, in the absence of this, we are mired in a situ-
ation in which permanent austerity serves in effect to lock in and further institutionalise 
proposed and already achieved cuts in public services. This would indeed reinforce an 
already deeply embedded neo-liberalism which has developed hand-in-hand with an 
aggressively liberal political culture in which, as he rightly points out, individuals are 
increasingly seen to bear responsibility for the advantage they take from the limited 
opportunities available to them such that outcomes are ‘a matter of individual blame or 
praise’. This, he suggests, characterises the emerging politics of new social risk. But it 
also provides opportunities for a social democratic alternative based on a return to a 
more collective view of how such risks might be managed more collectively (see also 
Taylor-Gooby, 2013). 
There is very little here with which I disagree. Taylor-Gooby’s analysis, though in no 
sense a direct implication of the account of the crisis I offer, is deeply compatible with it 
and, indeed, builds upon it. It addresses a supremely important set of concerns about 
the political conditions of existence of the transition to the kind of new growth model 
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that I propose and it reminds us, in a most timely manner, that the left does not merely 
have to win the economic battle of ideas if it is to have the chance to preside over that 
transition. And, above all, it shows us how a new economic growth model can and must 
be aligned with a new social model if it is to prove politically sustainable. 
Given that we agree on so much, I confi ne myself merely to one point, by way of an 
observation and a warning. What concerns me is that the Labour opposition (the most 
obvious and perhaps the only possible carrier of such a new growth and new social 
model) is in danger, even at this point, of precluding such a transition. For if, as now 
seems likely, it enters the 2015 General Election campaign committed to the (presum-
ably) outgoing Coalition’s spending commitments for even the fi rst two years of its 
parliamentary term, then it will be Labour, rather than the Coalition, that will preside over 
the much-vaunted but still largely deferred public austerity we have been threatened 
with for so long. That would, of course, be a most tragic irony.
Tony Dolphin: ‘you can’t cut your way out of a growth crisis’
Like Peter Taylor-Gooby, Tony Dolphin very generously couches his important interven-
tion in this debate in terms consistent with and familiar from The Failure of Anglo-Liberal 
Capitalism. As such, we too agree on a very great deal here. The old, broken, economic 
model – Anglo-liberalism – he argues remains strangely unthreatened by the crisis. 
Though it is (in the absence of the growth on which it relied) hardly in the rudest of 
health, it nonetheless remains in place. The reasons for this are three-fold. First, 
paradigm shifts are exceedingly rare; there have only been two in the entire post-war 
period. Second, neither the Coalition nor Labour has advocated a coherent alternative to 
Anglo-liberalism, with both confi ning their thoughts on how to respond to the crisis to 
the parameters of the existing paradigm. And, third, this has been reinforced by the 
framing of the crisis as one of debt, not of growth. 
As he crisply points out, platitudes such as ‘you can’t borrow your way out of a 
recession’ may well be very poor economics, but they remain strongly resonant – and 
they continue to exert a powerful hold over public opinion. But I think he is also right to 
suggest that this is at least in part because there has been far too little attempt to fi nd 
an alternative, equally compelling, public narrative based on rather better economic 
thinking. The mantra he offers, a truism of at least progressive economics, strikes me as 
an excellent starting point: ‘you cannot cut your way out of a growth crisis’. 
Dolphin goes on by developing an analysis again consistent with my own but by 
no means confi ned by it, to argue that Labour must now accept its own culpability, in 
offi ce, for both the build-up of unsustainable private (consumer, commercial and fi nan-
cial) debt and for the increasing dependence of growth upon it. It is not diffi cult to 
understand why it might be reluctant to make such a public concession. But it needs 
to show that it understands the nature of the crisis if it is credibly to commit to its 
resolution, even if that means casting a retrospective shadow over its economic tenure 
since 1997. 
This brings us to the crux of Dolphin’s powerfully compelling argument in his 
demonstration of the need for a sustained attack on the defi ciencies of the Anglo-liberal 
model of capitalism which long pre-date the crisis. As he so correctly points out, the 
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most eloquent case for an alternative is the palpable failure of the Coalition to deliver 
the much vaunted rebalancing of the domestic economy we were promised: and this 
despite a near 25 per cent devaluation of the currency and the associated stimulus to 
export markets. What this reveals, as he again makes clear, is that, under consecutive 
administrations, ‘Britain’s industrial base was allowed to shrink to the point that it no 
longer has the capacity to compete effectively, even when given a big boost to its 
competitiveness’. The effect has been that, in its ever more anxious and frenetic attempt 
to fi nd some growth before the election, the Coalition has found itself resorting to the 
pump priming of mortgage-debt. This, it need hardly be pointed out, is a most 
desperate and dangerous move – with lots of downstream risk and very little, if any, 
substantive gain to date or in prospect. This is privatised Keynesianism mark II. 
So what can be done? Here, again, we are in complete agreement. Dolphin draws 
out fi ve key implications of what is, in effect, a shared analysis: (i) that unemployment be 
given an equal footing with infl ation management in a revised mandate for the Bank of 
England – and that this be backed by appropriate labour-market reforms to promote 
improved access to employment for the most socially and economically marginalised; (ii) 
that house building replace demand-stimulation targeted on the mortgage market; (iii) 
that we regulate the fi nancial sector in such a way as to prevent the crowding out of 
credit and investment by bank recapitalisation; (iv) that we pursue, clearly, unapologeti-
cally and explicitly, an export-oriented industrial policy; and (v) that we promote 
mutualisation and re-mutualisation as a popular alternative to shareholder capitalism. 
Hopi Sen: what’s Anglo and what’s liberal about Anglo-liberal capitalism?
Of the four commentaries, Hopi Sen’s is by far the most diffi cult to respond to. As a 
response, it is the most extensive and perhaps the most detailed and its charge-sheet (if 
I can call it that) is certainly the longest. And, on the surface, it would appear as though 
we disagree about quite a lot. That said, appearances can be deceptive – and to some 
extent they may well be so here. Sen argues that whilst I largely get the solution to the 
crisis right, I do so whilst getting the analysis of the underlying affl iction wrong – since 
this is not, for him, a crisis of ‘Anglo-liberal’ capitalism in any meaningful sense. I could, 
of course, console myself with the thought that it is far better to agree on what needs to 
be done and to disagree on why than the converse. But I suspect there is more to this 
than that. Indeed, I hope to show briefl y in what follows that much, though by no means 
all, of the ostensible difference between us is semantic rather than substantive. 
His comments remind me, in a way, that small books are dangerous things – they 
can focus the mind (hopefully of the reader as much as the author), but they also tend 
to be characterised by the kind of simplifying devices and tropes which might not be 
tolerated in a more extended discussion of the same topic. In part, then, his challenge 
might be seen as a posing of the question of how far I can go and how far I am 
prepared to go in defending one such simplifying trope – the concept of Anglo-liberal 
capitalism. 
The crux of the case against The Failure of Anglo-Liberal Capitalism that he 
presents is that this can’t really be a crisis of Anglo-liberalism since other self-evidently 
Anglo-liberal cases – notably Australia (where I sit as I write this), New Zealand and 
Renewal 21.2-3.indd   81 28/08/2013   16:01:32
RENEWAL Vol 21 No. 2/3
82
Canada – have not suffered Britain’s fate. This is an interesting and penetrating observa-
tion and there would seem, on the face of it, to be something to it. But it is far from 
unproblematic. A number of points might (briefl y) be made. 
First, The Failure of Anglo-Liberal Capitalism is part of a wider argument, set out in 
its fullest form in The Political Economy of European Welfare Capitalism (Hay and 
Wincott, 2012) and in a series of comparative articles (Hay and Smith 2013a, 2013b) 
about the nature of the crisis. Thus, the labelling of this as an ‘Anglo-liberal’ crisis is, in 
fact, a comparative claim – just one not set out so clearly as such in the (little) book in 
question, with its more limited focus on the British case. Second, and rather more signifi -
cantly, in that wider argument ‘Anglo-liberalism’ is not solely an attribute of country cases 
which are both ‘Anglo’ and ‘liberal’, but rather (as in much of the wider comparative polit-
ical economy literature) a label or marker for a series of policy dispositions (as Sen 
himself concedes at the start of his response). Thus, Anglo-liberalising tendencies have 
been present, even prevalent, in a number of European and other political economies at 
various points in time since the 1980s – and there are invariably counter-tendencies to 
them, even in obviously ‘Anglo-liberal’ cases such as Britain or Ireland. 
The argument that I was seeking to make, then, is not that we should expect to see 
evidence of the same pathologies in all political economies in which economic liberalism 
is ascendant and English is the principal language – there is no expectation here that 
Australia or Canada should inevitably suffer Britain’s fate; nor that France or Spain 
should escape it. No, the argument is rather different; though it is clearly one that Hopi 
Sen has missed (despite my attempts to be very clear about it in the text). Let me 
restate it as simply as I can. It is that, at each and every signifi cant point in the estab-
lishment of the economic and political preconditions of Britain’s unsustainable growth 
model, the core decisions made reveal a profound Anglo-liberal market disposition. This 
is as true of Ireland as it is of Britain, and I suspect it is true of the eurozone too. 
And what of Canada, Australia and New Zealand? Well, my argument here is also 
relatively straight forward. In a way, Canada’s good fortune was that its Anglo-liberalism 
had not gone (quite) so far (by the onset of the crisis) as to unleash the ultimately 
unsustainable ‘privatised Keynesian’ growth dynamic that I detect in, say, the Irish or 
British cases. That said, there is a certain irony here – in that much of the (Anglo-liberal) 
fi nancial and mortgage-market deregulation which would have made this possible was 
in the process of being implemented as the crisis hit. Canada was spared, in effect, by 
‘late-onset’ Anglo-liberalisation. The Australian and New Zealand cases are rather 
different – for they, too, infl ated potentially unsustainable housing and asset-price 
bubbles in their economies in a typically ‘Anglo-liberal’ vein, but they did so on the back 
of, and whilst enjoying the proceeds of, a rather more complex growth model – in which 
exports of raw materials to China and East Asia played, as they continue to play, a 
crucial role. In short, these economies were spared the crisis (despite their Anglo-
liberalism) by their parasitism on Chinese growth. This, I hope, goes some way both to 
explaining my continued use of the term ‘Anglo-liberal’ here and to defending my 
characterisation of this as, at heart, a profoundly ‘Anglo-liberal’ crisis. 
In a sense, our other ostensible disagreements are quite modest and can hopefully 
be dealt with more briefl y still. There are essentially two of these. The fi rst is that, 
according to Sen’s reading of my argument, I would have liked to see the Bank of 
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England respond in a manner more consistent with its formal mandate before the crisis 
(and particularly from 2006) in continuing to raise interest rates to control infl ation 
(including house-price infl ation). This, Sen contends (echoing Mervyn King), might well 
have led to less of an asset-price bubble, but would also have produced slower growth, 
rising unemployment, and ultimately the prospect of a prolonged undershoot in the infl a-
tion target. 
In fact I agree with almost all of this. My point is not that the Bank of England 
behaved irresponsibly, but that, given the unsustainable growth model Britain had at the 
time, it had little choice but to continue to infl ate the bubble until it burst (ignoring its 
formal mandate in the process). The problem was not the conduct of the Monetary 
Policy Committee, nor even the Bank’s remit, but the inherent unsustainability of the 
growth model itself. 
Finally, Sen suggests that my views on current interest rate spreads and contempo-
rary monetary policy are contradictory, in that I argue for concerted downward pressure 
on commercial and consumer interest rate spreads (which would reduce the cost of 
borrowing) whilst at the same time suggesting that the government and Bank are being 
irresponsible in seeking to pump-prime the mortgage market. In fact there is no contra-
diction here. My point is again a simple one, though one intended to reveal something of 
a paradox. The point is that an unprecedentedly low base rate does not, in and of itself, 
deliver low borrowing costs at a time when the banks are recapitalising – and using 
consumer and commercial interest rate spreads to do so. This is bad for growth in the 
short to medium-term, regardless of whether that growth takes the form of a 
(dangerous) resuscitation of the old growth model (to which I am opposed) or the move, 
through the more targeted supply of credit, to a new growth model (which I favour). But, 
as I see it, there is no contradiction in advocating concerted political pressure (from the 
government and the Bank) on the banks to reduce their interest rate spreads. 
This may still make it sound as though we disagree about quite a lot. But I think 
that is wrong. For I fi nd myself in almost total agreement with Sen’s conclusions. I 
agree whole-heartedly with the need to think of the transition to a new and alternative 
model of growth in terms of gradualism, even incrementalism. That said, it is vitally 
important that we retain throughout this process a clear sense of purpose, of where we 
are and where we need to be headed. I agree, too, that we need to prepare ourselves 
for the pain we must endure if we are to make that kind of transition. And fi nally, I 
agree that in being prepared to endure that pain we should be bolstered by the certain 
knowledge that if this not achieved in a socially conscious and collectively just manner 
something far, far worse – in terms of both economic performance and social equity is 
likely to befall us. 
Nicola Smith: putting what went wrong right
Nicola Smith’s careful and perceptive commentary also raises a series of important 
points. Her intervention is perhaps closest to that of Tony Dolphin, in that it proceeds 
largely from a shared diagnosis of Britain’s current political and economic affl iction and 
how we got here. I agree with very much of it – even on a number of points where, I 
suspect, she sees more of a difference between us. 
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She presents essentially six objections to aspects of the argument I present or the 
political implications I draw from it. I will attempt to deal with each in turn. First, she 
suggests that I give insuffi cient emphasis to the structural imbalance in the economy, 
particularly that between a bloated fi nancial services sector and the rest. She points out, 
quite rightly, that high leverage, short-term funding and limited regulation, combined 
with the sheer size of the sector, exacerbated Britain’s exposure to the crisis. In fact I 
agree with all of this and that it is not crystal clear from the book that I wrote is a pres-
entational error on my part – for that is certainly how I see it. Again, these points are 
perhaps more clearly made in the kind of comparative context I set out with Daniel 
Wincott in The Political Economy of European Welfare Capitalism (2012), but I would 
hope that they are at least implicit in The Failure of Anglo-Liberal Capitalism. 
Her second point is of a similar kind, namely that I give insuffi cient attention to the 
impact of the crisis in the banking sector on business lending. Again, insofar as this is a 
warranted criticism, I accept it. I had certainly hoped to make this point more clearly. In 
a way, it is diffi cult to make too much of it, as it is terribly, terribly important. Indeed, this 
is precisely why a targeted assault on interest rate spreads on commercial lending 
(particularly where such lending might contribute to building export-market share gener-
ating capacity) is so high on my list of necessary reforms. Once again, we are in almost 
complete agreement. 
A third point is, in a sense, a further implication of the argument I present – and, 
again, one I would accept without reservation. Smith points to the potential fragility of 
the kind of recovery that we might well be experiencing at the moment – and she is right 
to do so. For if growth returns to the US economy and if, as today, growth is higher in 
the US than in Britain, there is a grave danger that it will fuel (quite literally) an increase 
in the demand for oil and escalate oil prices (denominated in dollars) at the same time 
as the dollar strengthens against sterling. This, of course, can only prove infl ationary and 
hence a likely source of interest rate rises which are bound to threaten those already 
struggling to service interest-only mortgage debt. As this suggests, house price defl a-
tion is never far off and, ironically, it might well be precipitated by the partial recovery of 
the US economy that may already be underway. 
A fourth point is crucial – and a very welcome further development of the argument 
I make. It is one that I have referred to before, but it is one that arguably should have 
featured more prominently in The Failure of Anglo-Liberal Capitalism. It is that another 
key determinant of the appeal of the Anglo-liberal growth model has been stagnating 
household income and declining real wages. This I think is a very important point and 
one that is arguably central to explaining the appeal to so many households of placing 
one’s fi nancial eggs in the housing market basket in the hope of fuelling consumption 
(immediate or deferred) through assumed equity release. 
Thus far we are in near complete agreement. But on the fi nal two points we part 
company at least a little. The fi rst of these issues concerns asset-based welfare and the 
extent to which the governments of Blair and Brown sought, quite consciously, to stoke 
house-price infl ation and other forms of asset-appreciation as a means of compensating 
workers for stagnant wages and growing and projected welfare residualism (even whilst 
welfare spending was growing). Smith suggests that the evidence for this is not espe-
cially compelling; I must confess that I remain unconvinced. Whilst I think she is right to 
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point to the real improvement in the incomes of families with children, and the role of tax 
credits, for instance, in this, I simply do not see this as a reason for refuting the idea that 
Labour in offi ce had, from around 2000, a conscious strategy for promoting asset-based 
welfare. I see these as separate, not related, claims. 
Finally, and perhaps most signifi cantly, there remains some (blue, red or green) 
water between us on the question of fi nancial market re-regulation. But the question 
here is one of political strategy, rather than a more substantive disagreement about the 
pathologies of the British fi nancial sector. My concern (in the passages she sees as too 
soft on fi nancial market actors) was that we should not be distracted from the signifi cant 
task at hand by indulging ourselves in a frenzy of ‘banker bashing’ to the exclusion of 
other more important reforms. However cathartic, the targeting of bankers and the 
bonus culture they have indulged is no solution to our problems. That said, and if only 
out of a sense of responsibility for the damage infl icted by the model of capitalism we 
have built and the global contagion of the crisis it has spawned, we do need a profound 
re-regulation of our banking sector – on that there is no dispute. But we need to 
proceed with some caution. For a rapid assault on the banking sector is actually likely to 
make the return to growth a more diffi cult proposition in the short- to medium-term and 
that perhaps suggests that we have to proceed with more deftness and more incremen-
tally than we might wish. In a manner analogous to the idea that we make defi cit 
reduction and ultimately debt repayment conditional on growth, we should perhaps 
think of domestic fi nancial market reform and re-regulation as conditional on the slow 
weaning of ourselves off our old unsustainable growth model. As this suggests, we 
agree on where we need to get to and we agree, I think, that it can only take a long 
time. My point is simply that in our understandable eagerness to put in place the basis 
for a longer-term and more sustainable growth model we don’t rush headlong into those 
parts of the necessary reforms that might most hinder the short-term prospects of a 
partial economic recovery on which we can build. 
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